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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
The State of Idaho appeals from the district court's order granting 
suppression of incriminating statements made by Jon Steven Huffaker. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Ben Savage came into the Custer County Sheriff's office and told Deputy 
Maydole that Huffaker had threatened him with a gun. (Tr., p. 12, Ls. 13-19.) 
Deputy Kramer found Huffaker and brought him to the sheriff's office, where 
Deputy Maydole interviewed him. (Tr., p. 14, Ls. 10-12; p. 42, L. 5 - p. 47, L. 21; 
State's Exhibit 1.) After the interview Deputy Maydole arrested Huffaker. (Tr., p. 
23, Ls. 15-21.) Shortly thereafter, while in jail, Huffaker requested and was 
provided a statement form, which he filled out. (Tr., p. 47, L. 22 - p. 49, L. 24.) 
The state charged Huffaker with one count of aggravated assault with a 
deadly weapon enhancement. (R., pp. 27-30.) Huffaker moved to suppress his 
statements based on an alleged violation of his Miranda 1 rights. (R., pp. 49-53.) 
The district court granted the motion and suppressed both Huffaker's oral and 
written statements. (R., pp. 86-88.) The state filed a timely notice of appeal. / 
(R., pp. 108-11.) 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although Huffaker moved to also 
suppress physical evidence, such is not subject to suppression for a Miranda 
violation. United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 641-42 (2004). 
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err by suppressing evidence of Huffaker's statements, 
because Huffaker was not in custody equivalent to formal arrest when he gave 
his oral statements and his written statement was not the product of 
interrogation? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Finding A Miranda Violation 
A. Introduction 
The district court suppressed Huffaker's oral statements made in an 
interview with Deputy Maydole and a subsequent written statement Huffaker 
prepared in jail. (R., pp. 86-88.) The district court erred because the oral 
statements were made prior to Huffaker being in custody requiring giving of 
Miranda warnings and the written statement was not in response to police 
questioning. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. Diaz, 
144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 741 (2007). 
C. Miranda Warnings Were Not Required Because The Oral Statements 
Were Made Prior To Huffaker Being In Custody And The Written 
Statement Was Not In Response To Police Questioning 
"[P]olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to 
everyone whom they question." Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
Rather, the warnings are required only when a suspect is subjected to "custodial 
interrogation." Montejo v. Lousiana, 556 U.S. 778, 795 (2009) (the Miranda 
"regime ... applies only in the context of custodial interrogation"); Miranda v. 
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Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). In this case Huffaker's oral statements, while 
given in response to interrogation, were made prior to his arrest, and he was not 
in custody equivalent to formal arrest. His written statement, made after his 
arrest, was not made in response to any interrogation. Thus, Miranda warnings 
were not required and the district court erred in suppressing the evidence of the 
statements. 
1. Huffaker Was Neither Arrested Nor In Custody Equivalent To 
Formal Arrest When He Made His Oral Statements 
An interrogation is "custodial" for purposes of Miranda only where "there is 
a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated 
with a formal arrest." California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983) (internal 
quotes omitted); see also State v. James, 148 Idaho 574, 576-77, 225 P.3d 
1169, 1171-72 (2010). A mere investigative detention does not trigger the 
requirement of Miranda warnings. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 
(1984); State v. Ybarra, 102 Idaho 573, 576-77, 634 P.2d 435, 438-39 (1981). 
When applying this test the "only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the 
suspect's position would have understood his situation." Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 
442; State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519, 523, 50 P.3d 1014, 1018 (2002); State v. 
Albaugh, 133 Idaho 587, 591, 990 P.2d 753, 757 (Ct. App. 1999). Factors that 
may be considered include the time and location of the interrogation, the conduct 
of the officers, the nature and manner of the questioning, and the presence of 
other persons. Albaugh, 133 Idaho at 591, 990 P.2d at 757; State v. Medrano, 
123 Idaho 114, 117, 844 P.2d 1364, 1367 (Ct. App. 1992). Custody to the 
degree associated with formal arrest alone is not enough to create the necessity 
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of Miranda warnings, but is merely a "necessary and not sufficient condition" to 
finding a requirement of Miranda warnings. Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 
113 (2010) (warnings not required in context of prison interview). "The burden of 
showing custody rests on the defendant seeking to exclude evidence based on a 
failure to administer Miranda warnings." State v. Silver, 155 Idaho 29, 32, 304 
P.3d 304, 307 (Ct. App. 2013). 
Huffaker failed to prove he was under formal arrest or custody equivalent 
thereto when he was interviewed by Deputy Maydole. The evidence showed that 
Deputy Kramer pulled his patrol car into a parking lot near where he saw 
Huffaker walking, and Huffaker approached the car. (Tr., p. 42, L. 24 - p. 44, L. 
8.) Deputy Kramer used no sirens or lights, made no verbal commands, and 
presented no show of force. (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 3-14.) Deputy Kramer asked 
Huffaker about the incident with Savage, and Huffaker admitted pointing a gun at 
Savage.2 (Tr., p. 44, Ls. 15-25.) Deputy Kramer informed Huffaker that Deputy 
Maydole was "at the office and would probably like to talk to him about it." (Tr., p. 
45, Ls. 1-6.) Huffaker responded, "[T]hat would be fine." (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 7-8.) 
Concerned that Huffaker was intoxicated and not wanting him to drive, Deputy 
Kramer offered him a ride. (Tr., p. 45, Ls. 9-19.) Huffaker rode in the front seat 
with the deputy, and his dog rode in the back. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 1-5.) 
At the sheriffs office Deputy Maydole conducted a very short, informal and 
low-key interview in a room with an open door to a short hallway ending in a 
public area of the sheriff's office. (State's Exhibit 1; Tr., p. 32, L. 15 - p. 33, L. 
2 This statement was not suppressed by the district court. (R., p. 88 (suppressing 
statements after "entering the interview room").) 
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14.) At the conclusion of the interview Deputy Maydole placed Huffaker under 
arrest. (Tr., p. 23, Ls. 15-21.) 
This evidence shows Huffaker was neither under arrest nor in custody 
equivalent to formal arrest when questioned by Deputy Maydole. The entire 
encounter was without any of the trappings of formal arrest. Huffaker was not 
handcuffed; there were no commands or show of force; and the entire encounter 
was cordial, non-confrontational and short. 
The district court based its conclusion Huffaker was in custody on four 
factual findings: (1) Huffaker "had no way of returning home"; (2) he was the 
"sole suspect"; (3) he was not told he could leave; and (4) a "normal person" 
would not have believed they [sic] could end the interview and freely leave the 
police station." (R., p. 87.) These findings, cumulatively and individually, fail to 
support a conclusion that officers had restrained Huffaker's freedom to a degree 
associated with formal arrest. 
The evidence presented at the hearing was that Huffaker lived "four to five 
blocks" from the sheriff's office, a walk of about ten minutes. (Tr., p. 47, Ls. 12-
21.) The district court's factual finding that Huffaker "had no way of returning 
home" is true only if one considers a ten-minute walk extremely onerous. 
Likewise, there is no evidence that Deputy Kramer was unwilling to drive 
Huffaker back home had he not been arrested. That Huffaker had, at most, a 
ten-minute walk to get back home is not evidence he was under arrest. 
It is true that Huffaker was the "sole suspect" and was not told he could 
leave, but these facts are inconsequential. Likewise, even assuming a 
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reasonable person would not have felt free to leave the interview under the facts 
of this case (a conclusion not supported by the evidence), such is not an 
indication of custody equivalent to formal arrest. Indeed, suspicion is present in 
all police questioning and often the suspect is not "free to leave" because he is 
subjected to an investigative stop. 
It is well established that an investigative detention does not trigger the 
Miranda requirements. See McCarty, 468 U.S. at 440. Likewise, the requirement 
of Miranda warnings is not imposed "simply because the questioning takes place 
at the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police 
suspect." Miathiason, 429 U.S. at 495. All of the factors articulated by the court 
(cannot go home, suspect, not told he was free to go, reasonably believed he 
was not free to go) are present in all investigative detentions. Even assuming 
that Huffaker's contact with the police was not a consensual encounter, nothing 
found by the district court raised the level of custody to the functional equivalent 
of formal arrest. Application of the law to the facts found by the district court 
shows Miranda warnings were not required and the district court erred by 
suppressing Huffaker's oral statements. 
2. Huffaker Did Not Make His Written Statement In Response To 
Interrogation 
"Interrogation," for purposes of Miranda, is "questioning initiated by law 
enforcement officers," which includes "any words or actions on the part of the 
police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police 
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 
suspect." Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600-01 (1990) (internal 
7 
quotations omitted). The evidence presented showed that Huffaker requested 
and filled out a statement form while in jail because he wished for charges to be 
brought against Ben Savage. (Tr., p. 48, L. 1 - p. 49, L. 25.) Although Huffaker 
was at that time clearly in custody, there is no evidence of any police-initiated 
questioning. 
CONCLUSION 
The state requests this Court to vacate the district court's order 
suppressing evidence of Huffaker's statements and to remand for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 9th day of April, 2015 
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